History of Shared Water Resource Management
Water management concerns in the Great Lakes Basin have for decades been largely centered on concerns about pollution and diversion of the water resources and how best to protect those resources from out-of-basin interests. Given the location of the basin at the border of the U.S. and Canada, many of these problems-and the policies designed to address them-are transboundary in nature.
Since the early 20th century, many compacts, treaties, and agreements have sought to coordinate management of the basin's water resources (Table WB 2.1). These agreements have evolved from an emphasis on data collection to more comprehensive water management policies and procedures. The latest round of adjustments was initiated in 1998, when the Province of Ontario approved a permit for a private interest to extract 160 million gallons of Lake Superior water per year to be sold in Asia.
1 This led to a public outcry both in Ontario and neighboring U.S. states that rely on Lake Superior water. In response, the Great Lakes governors and the premiers of Ontario and Quebec negotiated w a t e r b r i e f 2
The Great Lakes Water Agreements 
Function and Governance of the Agreement and Compact
The goals of the 2005 Agreement are to maintain and strengthen cooperative and sustainable management, ecosystem protection, and data collection established in previous agreements. It also seeks to move beyond the previous agreements by adapting management models to changing climate conditions (which is quite uncommon for transboundary water agreements [Cooley et al. 2009 ]), emphasizing public participation in Basin management, and incorporating elements of the precautionary principle into the decision-making processes (CGLG 2005a , Squillace 2007 ). The Agreement is notable in that it provides a framework for jointly managing both surface and ground waters within the basin (CGLG 2005a 
Support for and Criticisms of the Compact
The Compact has been widely supported and lauded for pioneering the way for sustainable and collaborative whole-basin management schemes across state and national boundaries. Many contend that whole-basin management that cuts across political borders provides a better opportunity to address concerns of sustainability and ecosystem health, and to generally manage and regulate the natural resource more coherently and effectively (Ericson 2007 , Forster and Marley 2008 , PEC 2008 , Office of Betty Sutton 2008 .
However, the Compact has also faced numerous criticisms, typically regarding ideological views on the appropriate ownership of water resources. Some, such as Ohio state senator Tim Grendell, believe that the Compact puts all water resources in the public trust, threatening property owners' rights to groundwater (Henry 2007 , Oosting 2008 . Others, such as U.S. representative Bart Stupak, assert that bottled water's exemption from the Compact's diversion ban may allow private interests to bypass the Compact and take Great Lakes water out of the public trust (Egan 2008) .
In addition to these debates, some have questioned the effectiveness of the Compact's stipulations in meeting its stated objective of ensuring sustainable use of freshwater resources and ecological integrity in the Basin. For instance, one critique laments the Compact's and Agreement's marginalization of the International Joint Commission, calling the Compact a move away from true bilateral dispute resolution (as enacted by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909) to a largely subnational approach (Parrish 2006) . Another contends that the Compact is inconsistent with respect to definitions for "diversions" and "products," potentially opening the door for weaker state control over water exports. This same critique argues that, despite apparent commitments to public participation and addressing climate change, the Compact in fact has few provisions that implement these commitments in meaningful ways (Olson 2006) .
Professor Mark Squillace of the University of Colorado Law School has provided one of the most pointed critiques (see Squillace 2007) . He contends that the Compact's focus on new withdrawals as opposed to existing withdrawals and consumptive uses severely limits its ability to address adverse impacts on freshwater ecosystems. He further argues that the Compact inappropriately restricts state power to divert water to areas within their state lines but outside the basin. Further, the Compact's ban on outof-basin diversions may place greater strain on nearby watersheds that have less water to begin with, effectively transferring environmental impacts out of the basin rather than minimizing them. While prohibiting out-of-basin diversions, the Compact does not provide any stipulations on the diversion of water from watershed to watershed within the basin. Because of this, it may not adequately protect from significant ecological impacts in certain areas within the basin, particularly vulnerable upper watersheds (Squillace 2007) .
Conclusion
Several decades of negotiations and legislation have led to the creation of the Great Lakes Compact-a unique transboundary, whole-basin approach to water management in the Great Lakes Basin. The Compact highlights a commitment to collaborative management of shared freshwater resources with the aim of preventing the disjointed and ineffective water management seen in many parts of the world. That said, given the highly sensitive nature of water-ecologically, politically, and culturally-the Compact has inevitably led to a wide range of concerns regarding its impacts on the environment, property rights, and states' rights, as well as debates as to whether it is structured in a way that best enables sustainable water use and ecosystem protection. Answers to these questions remain to be seen but will become clearer after the full provisions of the Compact come into effect and are implemented.
